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Civil Procedure: 




The advent of the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor2 provides the 
opportunity to reflect on the largely unnoticed collapse of the framework 
it announced for managing intra-class conflicts. The Amchem framework 
was bold, in that it broadly defined actionable conflicts to include 
divergent interests with regard to settlement allocation; market-based, in 
that it sought to regulate such conflicts by using subclasses to harness 
competing plaintiffs’ counsel’s financial incentives; and committed to 
intrinsic process values, insofar as, to assure structural fairness, the court 
was willing to upend settlements that would have eased the crush of 
asbestos litigation.  
Since the late 1990s, the lower federal courts have quietly flipped 
that regime on its head, limiting Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,3 
to their facts, narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts that warrant 
subclassing, and turning to alternative assurances of fairness—such as 
reliance on court-appointed settlement neutrals—that do not involve 
fostering competition among subclass counsel. This article connects the 
dots between Amchem and more recent, sprawling mass-tort settlement 
class actions in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion-injury litigations by 
providing a descriptive and institutional account of Amchem’s treatment 
in the lower courts.  
 
The Amchem Conflicts Management Regime 
 
In Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court overturned two of the 
largest mass tort settlements in U.S. history on the ground that intra-class 
conflicts of interest rendered representation inadequate. The trial court in 
each case had approved a class-action settlement of asbestos claims even 
though the members of the settlement class had divergent interests with 
regard to settlement design and fund allocation. The Court held that such 
conflicts could not be overcome merely by showing that a settlement was 
fair. Instead, the representation of absent class members in the settlement 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and adapted from Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L. 
REV. 785 (2017).  
 2. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 3. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
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process also had to be adequate. In Amchem and Ortiz, that meant that 
the settlement classes had to be divided into subclasses, each with their 
own representative plaintiffs and, importantly, their own lawyers, whose 
fees depended on the subclass members’ recoveries and who could thus 
be trusted to advance their interests when negotiating settlement terms. 
Failure to do so rendered class certification illegitimate and justified 
overturning the class settlements, leaving the federal trial courts saddled 
with the asbestos-litigation crisis without any viable tools for resolving it 
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. 
This approach to conflicts arose out of the mass-tort procedural 
infrastructure of the day. Due to then-prevailing jurisdictional doctrine, 
including the limits of diversity jurisdiction, much nationwide-class 
litigation occurred in state courts. Because class counsel’s role was 
contingent upon a court certifying the class and rendering a class 
judgment, and because other camps of plaintiffs’ counsel could easily 
file in a competing jurisdiction, settle with the defendant, and scoop the 
case, plaintiffs’ counsel experienced an intense and existential form of 
role-insecurity. Their investment in class litigation could at any moment 
be wiped out by an interloper, leading to what leading commentators saw 
as the most glaring ethical lapse of the era: the reverse auction, when 
defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel against each 
other, awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the lowest bidder.  
Thus, at the time it decided Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court 
faced a landscape in which federal courts seemed poorly situated to 
regulate the quality of multijurisdictional class actions, class counsel’s 
self-seeking stood out as the central problem, and agency-cost theory 
provided the conceptual framework for providing a conflicts-
management solution.4 Building on that foundation, the Court was 
naturally drawn to find some way to strengthen the adequacy-of-
representation inquiry using a market- or incentive-based frame, one that 
looked to the manipulation of counsel’s incentives. The Court 
accomplished its goal by stating what read like a clear approach to class 
conflicts: deny class certification in the absence of subclassing with 





                                                 
 4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative 
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 684-90 (1986). 
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Upending Amchem: A Quiet Revolution 
 
With few exceptions,5 the lower federal courts have quietly and 
successfully revolted. Two recent mass-tort cases reveal just how far the 
courts have moved away from the Amchem regime. In both cases, class 
members’ divergent interests regarding the design and allocation of any 
eventual settlement were apparent at the outset of the litigation. 
Nevertheless, the trial and appellate courts found either an absence of 
conflicts or that any conflicts were insufficiently fundamental to warrant 
denial of certification. 
In the BP oil-spill litigation, the same group of plaintiffs’ counsel 
appointed at the outset of the litigation to serve as members of the 
multidistrict-litigation (“MDL”) plaintiffs’ steering committee served as 
settlement class counsel in a series of economic-loss, personal-injury, 
and punitive-damages class-action settlements that were structured in a 
way that invited tradeoffs among class members and, even, with regard 
to the punitive-damages settlements, pitted class members against each 
other.  
For example, in the economic-loss settlement, BP assigned its claims 
against non-settling defendants to the settlement class. To resolve those 
and other claims, the MDL plaintiffs’ steering committee negotiated two 
new class settlements, one with Halliburton, the provider of the cement 
used at the original BP drill site, and another with Transocean, the 
owners of the drilling rig. These settlements resolved two categories of 
claims, those of the “Old Class” (the BP economic loss class described 
above), to end litigation regarding BP’s Assigned Claims, as well as 
those of a “New Class” of all persons with punitive-damages claims 
against Halliburton and Transocean, only a subset of whom were 
members of the Old Class. The New Class was both narrower and 
broader than Old Class. It was broader because it included “many 
claimants whose property suffered direct physical damage from the 
explosion and oil spill, but who were excluded from the Old Class. 
Among others, these include local governments . . . and oil and gas 
interests.”6 It was narrower because it included only that subset of Old 
Class members who could satisfy the “physical injury” threshold of the 
                                                 
 5. The Second Circuit is the lone flag-bearer of a strict reading of Amchem and 
Ortiz. See Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 
223 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson 
Corp., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 6. Transocean’s Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement 
(“Transocean Settlement Agreement”) at *19, In re BP Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 
(E.D. La. May 29, 2015), ECF No. 14644-1. 
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Robins Dry Dock rule7 and thus were entitled to a punitive-damages 
award.8 The same lawyers served as “Old Class” and “New Class” 
counsel. The agreements they negotiated with Halliburton and 
Transocean expressly pitted Old and New Class members against each 
other, in that the capped settlement amounts had to be allocated between 
them. Nevertheless, the trial court certified the settlement classes and 
granted final approval to the proposed settlements.9  
Unlike the BP litigation settlements, which involved no subclassing 
with separate counsel, the NFL concussion-injury litigation illustrates 
minimalist and pro forma use of subclassing, without guaranteeing truly 
separate and independent representation. From the outset of the case, it 
was obvious that any settlement would have to distinguish among class 
members based on a range of factors, including type of illness. The final 
NFL settlement did so through its central feature, an uncapped Monetary 
Award Fund overseen by a claims administrator that would provide 
compensation for Retired Players who submit proof of Qualifying 
Diagnosis. The settlement recognized only six Qualifying Diagnoses, 
from varying levels of neurological impairment to Alzheimer’s Disease, 
Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, and death with chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE). The settlement also released claims without 
compensation for many of the symptoms of CTE, such as changes in 
mood, including depression.10  
Though one can imagine subclassing on multiple dimensions, the 
trial court certified only two subclasses, for claimants with and without a 
Qualifying Diagnosis. The trial court appointed separate counsel for each 
subclass to participate in the negotiations, but they were appointed only 
after negotiations by all counsel had begun.11 Moreover, subclass counsel 
were appointed from the group of common-benefit counsel who had 
already been representing all plaintiffs in the MDL and were not only 
counsel for the subclasses but were also common-benefit counsel for all 
MDL plaintiffs as well as class counsel for all class members who also 
happened to have special responsibility for advancing subclass members’ 
interests.12 They did not even have responsibility for negotiating a 
settlement of subclass members’ claims or issues and instead just “played 
                                                 
 7. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
 8. Transocean Settlement Agreement at *18. 
 9. See Final Order and Judgment Granting Approval of HESI and Transocean 
Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreements at 2-4, In re BP Oil 
Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22253.  
 10. See Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 365, 367, 397 (E.D. Pa 2015). 
 11. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 429 (3d Cir. 2016).  
 12. NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429; Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 425. 
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an active role” in the mediation process.13 In the NFL concussion-injury 
litigation, subclass counsel’s fortunes did not clearly rise or fall with 
those of the class members; instead, as class counsel for all class 
members, their fees could arguably be determined based on the value of 
the settlement to class members as a whole. Nevertheless, the Third 
Circuit affirmed the class-certification and settlement-approval order 
entered by the trial court.14 
The trial and intermediate appellate courts in these recent mass tort 
class settlements deployed a stock set of moves to avoid being more 
rigorously faithful to the Amchem regime, including narrowly defining 
the scope of “fundamental” conflicts,15 raising the specter of 
“Balkanization” as a result of subclassing,16 relying on court-appointed 
neutrals in lieu of structural fairness,17 and finding proof of procedural 
fairness in the settlements’ substantive terms.18 In short, they flipped the 
broad, market-based, Amchem regime rooted in a commitment to 
intrinsic process values. In its stead, these and other courts have 
articulated a new conflicts-management regime that is more tolerant of 
conflicts, places more faith in the trial court’s ability to regulate 
conflicts, and looks to outcomes as proof of adequate representation.  
 
An Institutional Account 
 
What explains the emergence of this new conflicts-management 
regime? As noted, at the time Amchem and Ortiz were decided, federal 
courts were jurisdictionally challenged with regard to mass-tort class 
actions, and, relatedly, the reverse auction was the most glaring ethical 
challenge of the day. Congress and courts responded with new formal 
and informal institutional arrangements for managing mass-tort and other 
geographically dispersed class actions that together constitute a new 
                                                 
 13. See Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Class Settlement 
in the National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation ¶ 31, In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La. 
Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No.6423-9. 
 14. NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 447-48. 
 15. Economic Final Approval Order at 34 (finding no “fundamental” conflicts, and 
that “[i]t’s perfectly fair and reasonable, and indeed common and accepted, for settlement 
benefits to turn on strength of class members’ claims”); Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 376 
(narrowly defining “fundamental” conflicts as existing “where some [class] members 
claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the 
class.”). 
 16. Economic Final Approval Order at 35-36. 
 17. Id. at 33; Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 377. 
 18. Economic Final Approval Order at 31. 
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MDL model. This new model results from the interaction between the 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005, which has largely 
federalized multistate class actions, and the MDL statute,19 which 
centralizes them before a single federal court trial judge. So empowered, 
federal trial-court judges have innovated a range of case-management 
techniques that give them substantial control over litigation, partly via 
the appointment and supervision of plaintiffs’ steering committees whose 
positions are secure and who thus do not feel pressure to engage in 
reverse auctions. But without the possibility of class trials in these mass 
torts, MDL judges have only one possible successful outcome: 
settlement. Thus, while the new MDL model for managing litigation of 
mass torts and other geographically dispersed harms was born of mistrust 
of class counsel, it has had the effect of inspiring lower federal courts to 
trust them all the more at the time of settlement. The Amchem framework 
for regulating class conflicts now feels both less necessary and far less 
convenient, insofar as it fosters competition among subclass counsel in a 
system with only one endgame.  
 
                                                 
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
